I performed a static analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, utilizing version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The objective was to recognize possible security and personal privacy issues.

I have actually discussed DeepSeek formerly here.

Additional security and personal privacy concerns about DeepSeek have actually been raised.

See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone variation of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based simply on fixed analysis. This means that while the code exists within the app, there is no conclusive proof that all of it is performed in practice. Nonetheless, the existence of such code warrants scrutiny, specifically given the growing issues around information personal privacy, surveillance, the potential misuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage characteristics in between international powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct data to external servers, raising concerns about user activity monitoring, such as to ByteDance “volce.com” endpoints. NowSecure determines these in the iPhone app yesterday too.

• Bespoke encryption and information obfuscation techniques exist, with indicators that they could be used to exfiltrate user details.
• The app contains hard-coded public secrets, rather than depending on the user gadget’s chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking records detailed user habits without clear authorization.
• WebView manipulation exists, utahsyardsale.com which might permit the app to gain access to private external internet browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView manipulations is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A significant portion of the analyzed code appears to concentrate on gathering device-specific details, which can be used for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app collects different special device identifiers, including UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and provider details.
• System homes, set up plans, and root detection mechanisms recommend possible anti-tampering procedures. E.g. probes for the presence of Magisk, a tool that personal privacy advocates and security researchers use to root their Android gadgets.
• Geolocation and network profiling are present, suggesting possible tracking abilities and making it possible for or disabling of fingerprinting programs by region. - Hardcoded device design lists suggest the application might behave differently depending upon the found hardware. - Multiple vendor-specific services are used to draw out extra gadget details. E.g. if it can not identify the gadget through basic Android SIM lookup (because authorization was not approved), it tries manufacturer particular extensions to access the same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no conclusive conclusions can be drawn without dynamic analysis, a number of observed habits align with known spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app uses reflection and UI overlays, which might facilitate unauthorized screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, serial numbers, and other device-specific information are aggregated for unidentified purposes.
• The app executes country-based gain access to constraints and “risk-device” detection, suggesting possible security systems.
• The app implements calls to pack Dex modules, where extra code is loaded from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so files themselves turn around and make additional calls to dlopen(), which can be used to pack additional.so files. This facility is not normally inspected by Google Play Protect and other fixed analysis services.
• The.so files can be executed in native code, such as C++. Using native code includes a layer of intricacy to the analysis process and obscures the complete extent of the app’s capabilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more quickly escalate benefits, potentially making use of vulnerabilities within the os or device hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While data collection prevails in modern applications for debugging and enhancing user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises considerable personal privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app requires users to log in with a legitimate email, which ought to already offer sufficient authentication. There is no valid factor for the app to strongly gather and send distinct gadget identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other system homes.
  
  The extent of tracking observed here exceeds typical analytics practices, potentially allowing relentless user tracking and re-identification throughout devices. These behaviors, integrated with obfuscation strategies and network interaction with third-party tracking services, call for a greater level of analysis from security researchers and users alike.
  
  The work of runtime code loading as well as the bundling of native code recommends that the app might enable the deployment and execution of unreviewed, from another location delivered code. This is a serious potential attack vector. No evidence in this report is presented that from another location released code execution is being done, only that the facility for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, garagesale.es the app’s approach to spotting rooted devices appears extreme for an AI chatbot. Root detection is frequently justified in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and content defense are important, or in competitive computer game to prevent unfaithful. However, wiki.vst.hs-furtwangen.de there is no clear reasoning for such rigorous procedures in an application of this nature, raising further concerns about its intent.
  
  Users and companies thinking about installing DeepSeek should be aware of these possible dangers. If this application is being utilized within a business or government environment, additional vetting and security controls need to be implemented before enabling its release on handled gadgets.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis presented in this report is based on static code evaluation and does not indicate that all found functions are actively used. Further investigation is required for conclusive conclusions.