I conducted a fixed analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, using version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The objective was to determine prospective security and personal privacy issues.

I’ve written about DeepSeek formerly here.

Additional security and personal privacy concerns about DeepSeek have been raised.

See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone variation of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based purely on fixed analysis. This implies that while the code exists within the app, there is no definitive evidence that all of it is executed in practice. Nonetheless, oke.zone the existence of such code warrants analysis, particularly provided the growing issues around data privacy, monitoring, the prospective misuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage characteristics in between worldwide powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct data to external servers, raising concerns about user activity tracking, such as to ByteDance “volce.com” endpoints. NowSecure determines these in the iPhone app yesterday too.

• Bespoke file encryption and data obfuscation methods exist, bio.rogstecnologia.com.br with indications that they could be used to exfiltrate user details.
• The app contains hard-coded public secrets, rather than counting on the user device’s chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking captures detailed user habits without clear approval.
• WebView manipulation is present, which might permit the app to gain access to private external web browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView controls is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A significant part of the evaluated code appears to focus on gathering device-specific details, macphersonwiki.mywikis.wiki which can be utilized for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app collects different special gadget identifiers, consisting of UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and provider details.
• System homes, installed bundles, and root detection systems recommend potential anti-tampering steps. E.g. probes for the existence of Magisk, a tool that privacy advocates and security scientists use to root their Android gadgets.
• Geolocation and network profiling are present, suggesting possible tracking abilities and allowing or disabling of fingerprinting regimes by area.
• Hardcoded device design lists suggest the application might behave differently depending on the spotted hardware.
• Multiple vendor-specific services are utilized to extract additional gadget details. E.g. if it can not identify the device through basic Android SIM lookup (because consent was not granted), it attempts maker particular extensions to access the same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no definitive conclusions can be drawn without vibrant analysis, numerous observed behaviors line up with known spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app uses reflection and UI overlays, which could help with unapproved screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, serial numbers, and other device-specific information are aggregated for fraternityofshadows.com unidentified functions.
• The app executes country-based gain access to constraints and “risk-device” detection, recommending possible surveillance systems.
• The app executes calls to fill Dex modules, where additional code is packed from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so submits themselves turn around and make additional calls to dlopen(), townshipmarket.co.za which can be used to pack additional.so files. This center is not generally checked by Google Play Protect and other static analysis services.
• The.so files can be executed in native code, such as C++. The usage of adds a layer of intricacy to the analysis process and obscures the complete degree of the app’s abilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more easily escalate benefits, possibly exploiting vulnerabilities within the os or device hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While data collection prevails in contemporary applications for debugging and enhancing user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises significant personal privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app requires users to visit with a legitimate email, which ought to already provide enough authentication. There is no valid factor for the app to aggressively gather and send unique device identifiers, oke.zone IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system residential or commercial properties.
  
  The extent of tracking observed here exceeds typical analytics practices, potentially allowing persistent user tracking and re-identification throughout gadgets. These behaviors, combined with obfuscation techniques and network communication with third-party tracking services, require a greater level of examination from security researchers and users alike.
  
  The work of runtime code loading in addition to the bundling of native code suggests that the app could enable the deployment and execution of unreviewed, from another location provided code. This is a serious prospective attack vector. No proof in this report is provided that remotely released code execution is being done, just that the facility for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app’s method to finding rooted devices appears excessive for an AI chatbot. Root detection is often warranted in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and content protection are important, or in competitive video games to prevent unfaithful. However, there is no clear reasoning for such rigorous measures in an application of this nature, raising further concerns about its intent.
  
  Users and organizations thinking about setting up DeepSeek needs to know these possible dangers. If this application is being used within an enterprise or government environment, additional vetting and security controls must be implemented before permitting its deployment on managed gadgets.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis presented in this report is based upon static code review and does not suggest that all found functions are actively used. Further examination is required for conclusive conclusions.